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Recent Developments

State v. Smith:

I

na 4-3 decision, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland in
State v. Smith, 345 Md. 460, 693
A.2d 749 (1997), held that when a
police officer frisked the outer
clothing of a suspect and detected
no weapons, a secondary, more·
intrusive
search
was
unreasonable and violated the
suspect's Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.
On May 22, 1994, Baltimore
City Police Officer Sean White
responded to a call involving
individuals selling drugs and firing
weapons on a street corner.
Officer White observed four to five
men on the corner, none of whom
fit the description of the individual
suspected of firing the weapon.
Officer White did, however,
observe the respondent, William
L. Smith ("Smith"), place an
unidentifiable object in the back
waistband of his pants. Based on
Officer White's experience and the
nature of the call, he believed the
object was a handgun. Officer
and
White detained Smith
conducted an initial protective frisk
for weapons which revealed
nothing. Although Officer White
had patted-down the back
waistband of Smith in his original
search, he double checked his
search by pulling Smith's shirt out
to see whether he had missed a
weapon. Upon pulling out Smith's
shirt, a plastic bag containing
cocaine fell out.
The Circuit Court of Maryland
for Baltimore City denied Smith's
motion to suppress the cocaine on
the grounds that lifting Smith's
shirt was within the permissible
scope of a protective search for
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weapons. Smith was convicted of
possession with intent to distribute
cocaine. The Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland reversed the
decision and held that the circuit
court improperly denied Smith's
motion to suppress the cocaine
because Officer White exceeded
the lawful bounds of a proper
protective frisk when he double
checked his original pat-down.
Certiorari was granted and the
sole issue before the Court of
Appeals of Maryland was whether
a police officer could further verify
that a suspect was not armed
after an initial pat-down revealed
no weapons.
Because this case involved a
frisk for weapons in the absence
of probable cause to arrest, the
court reviewed and incorporated
into its decision the principles
established in Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). Smith at 464,693
A.2d at 751. In Terry, the United
States Supreme Court held that a
police officer may briefly detain
and conduct a "carefully limited"
frisk of a suspect's outer clothing
if the facts support an objectively
reasonable suspicion that the
suspect is involved in criminal
activity and may be armed. Id. at

465, 693 A.2d· at 751.
The
Supreme Court noted that the
purpose of a Terry frisk is to
ensure the safety of the police
officer as well as bystanders, but
it is not an evidence-gathering
search. Id. The Supreme Court
further determined that a police
officer should limit the search to
what is minimally necessary to
balance the competing interests of
the officer's self-protection and the
individual's Fourth Amendment
rights. Id. at 465-66, 693 A.2d at
751.
Although a pat-down frisk
alone is an acceptable intrusion,
the Court of Appeals of Maryland
has· recognized, as have other
courts, that under certain circumstances, a more intrusive search
may be necessary. Id. at 466,
693 A.2d at 751. In situations
where the suspect refuses to obey
the officer's commands or where
there
are
other
exigent
circumstances the officer may
dispense with the pat-down and
proceed with a more intrusive
search. Id. at 466-68, 693 A.2d at
751-52. However, a police officer
may not immediately dispense
with a pat-down frisk and proceed
with a more intrusive search
unless the officer is prevented
from conducting an effective patdown search. Id. at 466, 693 A.2d
at 752 (citing 4 Wayne R. LaFave,
Search and Seizure, A Treatise on
the Fourth Amendment § 9.5(b) at
272 (3d ed. 1996)).
In completing its review of
Terry, the court of appeals
concluded that a police officer
must use the least intrusive
means of discovering concealed
weapons
to
balance
the
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competing interests of officer
safety
and
a
suspect's
constitutional rights. Id. at 468,
693 A.2d at 753. However, the
court
next
reviewed
the
circumstances which prompted
the secondary search and
determined that Officer White
exceeded the permissible scope
of a Terry search. Id. at 470-71,
693 A.2d at 754.
The court conceded that
Officer White had a reasonable,
articulable suspicion that Smith
was armed and therefore was
justified in conducting a "minimally
intrusive" frisk. Id. at 462, 693
A.2d at 753. However, when the
pat-down revealed no weapons,
the risk of harm to the officer no
longer outweighed the suspect's
competing
interest
against
unreasonable
searches
and
seizures. Id. at 469, 693 A.2d at
753. The court concluded that
"when Officer White failed to
detect a weapon-like object, his
frisk of Smith should have
ceased." Id. at 470, 693 A.2d at
754.
Therefore, because the

cocaine was the fruit of the illegal
search, the court deemed it
inadmissible. Id. at 472, 693 A.2d
at 754.
In the dissenting opinion,
Judge Raker acknowledged that
an officer's right to conduct a
Terry frisk has limitations and not
every frisk justifies a more
intrusive search beyond the
suspect's outer clothing. Id. at
474, 693 A.2d at 755. However,
based
on
Officer
White's
experience and the nature of the
call, she found that Officer White
was justified in conducting the
secondary, "limited intrusion,"
when the original pat-down did not
satisfy his reasonable fear that
Smith was armed. Id. at 474,693
A.2d at 755.
Judge Raker
reasoned that it does not
necessarily follow that there is
less risk after a standard Terry
frisk, particularly if an experienced
officer such as Officer White had a
continued suspicion that a weapon
was present despite the negative
pat-down. Id. at 473, 693 A.2d at
755.

The close decision in State v.
Smith, which could have easily
weakened Terry in Maryland,
reflects
the
difficulty
in
distinguishing
between
the
competing interests of officer
safety
and
a
suspect's
constitutional rights.
Because
non-arrest searches involve swift
action based upon on-the-spot
observations by the police officer,
each step of the search process
must be independently justified.
To allow the secondary search in
the case at bar would entitle police
officers to conduct evidence
gathering searches in virtually any
situation in the name of officer
safety. Although officer safety is
an essential and necessary
concern, it should not be used as
a justification to conduct multiple
searches of a suspect when no
weapons were detected in the
initial search.
Respect for a
suspect's constitutional guarantee
against unreasonable searches
and seizures is paramount when
the initial frisk uncovers no
weapons.
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